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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The British writer and philosopher Iris Murdoch once wrote, “It is easy 
to say there is no God.  It is not so easy to believe it and to draw the 
consequences.”1  By this she meant that our vision of reality, our 
understanding of the way the world works, cannot help but influence our 
moral and political beliefs.  Politics is not so easily separated from 
metaphysics.  And questions of metaphysics, it turns out, take us readily into 
the realm of theology.  Whether one recognizes it or not, the position one 
takes on the question of God’s existence is inevitably linked to one’s 
position on a host of other moral and political issues. 
Modern liberals deny this, of course.  That is, they deny that 
metaphysics should have any relevance to political thought.  For at least the 
past century, liberals have insisted that political issues can—and, indeed, 
 *  Professor of Law, Indiana University, Robert H. McKinney School of Law, and Professor 
(adjunct) of Philosophy.  J.D. (1988), Ph.D. (1989), Georgetown University.  This essay is drawn 
from my forthcoming book, Five Liberal Thinkers: On God, Metaphysics and Liberalism and was 
presented at Pepperdine University School of Law’s February 2012 conference entitled, The 
Competing Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom? 
 1.  Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics, in EXISTENTIALISTS AND MYSTICS: WRITINGS ON 
PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 226 (Peter Conradi ed., 1997). 
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must—be bracketed from metaphysical questions.2  The most influential of 
recent liberals, John Rawls, went so far in his later work as to insist that his 
constraints on public reason require the bracketing of any “comprehensive 
doctrines”—his term for any religious or even broadly philosophical view of 
the world.3  Rawls argued that these constraints apply not only to officials in 
their public capacities, but to everyone in the course of private discourse.4  
However, whatever reasons there may be for separating political from 
ecclesiastical power, metaphysics will always have an inseparable 
philosophical connection to our moral and political judgments. 
Consider some of the ways in which modern liberal political thought 
depends upon ideas integral to the God-centered conception of the world.  
We claim to believe in the idea of human rights, which, at least traditionally, 
means that there must be some moral standards that exist independently of 
the positive laws of any given state.  To say that a Syrian dissident has a 
“right” to express his political opinion or that a member of a Chinese 
religious minority has the right to worship as she chooses cannot mean that 
they possess positive legal rights to do these things, since neither has such a 
right under their own legal regimes.  Taking rights seriously means taking 
seriously the idea of a transcendent moral order that measures the positive 
 2.  Liberals sometimes respond to the very idea that metaphysics or theology could have import 
to our political ideals either with a sense of astonished incredulity or a studied ennui.  Mark Lilla 
opened his book The Stillborn God in the spirit of incredulity: “We find it incomprehensible that 
theological ideas still inflame the minds of men, stirring up messianic passions that leave societies in 
ruin.  We assumed that this was no longer possible, that human beings had learned to  separate 
religious questions from political ones, that fanaticism was dead.  We  were wrong.”  MARK LILLA, 
THE STILLBORN GOD: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND THE MODERN WEST 3 (2007). 
And philosopher John Searle writes in the spirit of ennui: 
Nowadays . . . it is considered in slightly bad taste to even raise the question of God’s 
existence.  Matters of religion are like matters of sexual preference: they are not to be 
discussed in public, and even the abstract questions are discussed only by bores . . . .  For 
us, the educated members of society, the world has become demystified . . . .  The result 
of this demystification is that we have gone beyond atheism to a point where the issue no 
longer matters in the way it did to earlier generations. 
JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY: PHILOSOPHY IN THE REAL WORLD 34–35 (1998). 
 3.  JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 489 (1999). 
 4.  Rawls wrote:  
Some might say that the limits of public reason apply only in official forums and  so only 
to legislators, say, when they speak on the floor of parliament, or to  the executive and the 
judiciary in their public acts and decisions . . . .  But this does not go far enough. . . .  As 
reasonable and rational, and knowing that they  affirm a diversity of reasonable religious 
and philosophical doctrines, they  should be ready to explain the basis of their actions to 
one another in terms  each could reasonably expect that others might endorse as consistent 
with  their freedom and equality. 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 217–18 (1993).  In other words, freedom and equality require, 
at least in the context of political discussion, that the theist and the agnostic can only argue on 
common ground, i.e., that the theist cannot appeal to any belief which the agnostic does not share.  
In sum, equality and neutrality require that the argument’s parameters are the agnostic’s parameters. 
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law of particular nations.  We cannot have it both ways.  We cannot claim to 
believe in the existence of human rights that exist independently of positive 
law while denying the existence of the transcendent moral order on which 
these rights must be based. 
Still closer to home, many of our significant moral, political, and social 
ideals are predicated on the idea that persons are inherently free in the 
deepest metaphysical sense.  Our capacity for freedom not only lies at the 
foundation of our ideas of responsibility, blame, and merit, but grounds as 
well our noblest political ideals, including our commitments to liberalism 
and democracy.  Political rights in the liberal tradition have long been 
understood to protect our capacity to make self-constituting choices in the 
external world.  This is why we use the word “freedom” to refer both to our 
internal metaphysical freedom of the will, and our external political rights 
and liberties.  The two are connected: external liberty depends on freedom in 
the internal sense.  Deny the reality of the latter and we can make no sense 
of the former.  Freedom begins at home, within the interstices of the human 
self.   
Contemporary agnostics and nontheists are typically philosophical 
naturalists or materialists.5  As such, they are generally committed to a belief 
in determinism, the idea that the laws of cause and effect necessitate every 
human choice.6  If the determinist is correct, no one has ever made a 
genuinely free choice, a choice in which he could have chosen other than he 
 5.  I will use the terms “naturalism” and “materialism” as synonyms throughout this essay.  
Naturalism is the view that there are no supernatural entities—that the world is the product of 
natural, rather than divine forces.  In the history of philosophy, this view is closely related (though 
not identical) to materialism, the view that all things in the world must be explained in terms of mass 
energy.  Most particularly, materialism denies that the mind or soul has any existence independent of 
physical brain states.  See EDWARD FESER, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (2006) (providing an introductory 
discussion of the problems associated with the philosophy of mind); BERTRAND RUSSELL, Mind and 
Matter in Modern Science, in BERTRAND RUSSELL ON GOD AND RELIGION 151–63 (Al Seckel ed., 
1986) (discussing naturalism and materialism, and the materialistic conception of mind). 
 6.  The free will-determinism problem is of ancient vintage, yet we seem no closer to solving 
the problem after 2500 years of debate.  William James remarked that though some seemed to think 
the topic stale, he knew of no subject “less worn out” than the free will-determinism debate.  
WILLIAM JAMES, The Dilemma of Determinism, in THE WRITINGS OF WILLIAM JAMES 587 (John J. 
McDermott ed., 1977).  More recently, John Searle, a naturalist, conceded: 
After all these centuries of writing about free will, it does not seem to me that we have 
made very much progress.  Is there some conceptual problem that we are unable to 
overcome?  Is there some fact that we have simply ignored?  Why is it that we have made 
so little advance over our philosophical ancestors? 
JOHN R. SEARLE, FREEDOM AND NEUROBIOLOGY: REFLECTIONS ON FREE WILL, LANGUAGE, AND 
POLITICAL POWER 37–38 (2007). 
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did.7  The creeping determinism in modern thought has contributed not only 
to liberalism’s growing skepticism of personal responsibility but also makes 
it difficult for liberals to make coherent sense of their own commitments to 
political liberty.  What sense does it make to accord an almost sacred status 
to our personal choices if these choices are simply the predetermined effects 
of the constellation of biological and environmental factors that make us 
behave as we do?  If freedom of the will goes, so ultimately will political 
liberty.  Totalitarianism is the most likely political denouement of 
determinism. 
Still more fundamentally, philosophical naturalism obviously requires 
the rejection of the idea of the human soul.  Political theory has been able to 
dispense with the soul, but it has not been able to do without that modern 
psychological halfway house upon which so much of the rhetoric of 
“freedom of choice” depends—the idea of the self.  Among philosophers, as 
the soul goes, so goes the self.  David Hume sent the very notion packing by 
the middle of the eighteenth century,8 yet liberal political theory, 
psychology, and social theory continue to harbor this enigmatic 
philosophical fugitive.  They not only welcome him into their homes but, to 
the extent that modern liberalism has apotheosized the individual self, give 
him a place at the head of their table.  It makes little sense to enshrine self-
actualization, self-expression, or self-fulfillment as shibboleths of liberalism 
if the liberal no longer believes that there is a self to be expressed, fulfilled, 
or actualized.  But if the self exists as something other than a “social 
construction”—as an enduring unity that makes us the same person 
throughout our lives—what is it? 
The purpose of this essay is to explore what often is overlooked in 
political and constitutional discussions of the relationship between law and 
religion.  Law and religion are not natural adversaries.  They are thought to 
conflict today not simply because secular law must create a space for 
 7.  The famed criminal defense lawyer Clarence Darrow was a committed determinist who 
often employed deterministic explanations in closing arguments.  As he put it in his autobiography: 
No one attributes freewill or motive to the material world.  Is the conduct of man or the 
other animals any more subject to whim or choice than the action of the planets? . . .  We 
know that man’s every act is induced by motives that led or urged him here or there; that 
the sequence of cause and effect runs through the whole universe, and is nowhere more 
compelling than with man . . . .  While cause and effect are not always easy to discover, 
our observations have been so general that we are warranted in the belief that every 
manifestation of matter, and what we call mind, is the result of some cause, or causes, 
most of them fairly obvious, but some of them still beyond the ken of man.  That crime, 
so-called, stands out alone as an uncaused manifestation of human conduct is beyond the 
understanding of those who try to study and comprehend. 
CLARENCE DARROW, THE STORY OF MY LIFE 76–77 (1996). 
 8.  See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. 
DO NOT   1/9/13  2:27 PM 
[Vol. 39: 1401, 2013] Theism, Naturalism, and Liberalism 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1405 
competing religious viewpoints.  The source of the conflict runs much 
deeper.  It is nothing if not metaphysical—a conflict of worldviews. 
This essay explores the metaphysical conflicts between the religious and 
the secular-naturalist worldviews by examining the philosophy of John 
Stuart Mill.  I chose Mill not only because he is arguably the most important 
liberal philosopher of all time, the thinker who transformed liberalism from 
the older, classical to the modern, progressive ideal, but because he also had 
a well-developed metaphysical conception of human nature which is so 
strikingly in tension with his political liberalism.  Mill’s “harm principle,” 
developed in On Liberty, is the true philosophical source of the modern right 
of privacy.9  And his overarching justification for liberty as a means of self-
individuation is the dominant idea of freedom today.  Yet Mill was a deeply 
conflicted thinker—a utilitarian who was drawn to romanticism, a political 
libertarian and a metaphysical determinist, a naturalist who rejected God, 
soul, and self, who nevertheless made self-individuation the real animating 
justification for political liberty. 
The contradictions within Mill’s thought are the contradictions of 
liberalism itself.  They are ultimately our contradictions—and they derive 
from our own ambivalent attachments to theism and naturalism. 
II.  THE ROMANTIC AGNOSTIC 
Mill was educated by his father, James Mill, who was himself a close 
associate of Jeremy Bentham.10  The elder Mill had decided to make of his 
son an archetype of enlightened intellectuality—a utilitarian, a philosophical 
skeptic, a reformer—or as the elder Mill wrote to Bentham, “a successor 
worthy of both of us.”11  Today we would say the elder Mill homeschooled 
him, but ruthlessly.  Mill tells us that he was reading ancient Greek by the 
age of three, and studying the classics, learning Latin, and reading Plato in 
the original by seven or eight.12  By twelve, he mastered much of 
 9.  See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kate eds., Yale Univ. 
Press 2003) (1863) [hereinafter MILL, ON LIBERTY]. 
 10.  The following events were recounted first by Mill in his autobiography.  JOHN STUART 
MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 3–39 (Jack Stillinger ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1969) (1873) [hereinafter 
MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY] (recounting his childhood and education); see also NICHOLAS CAPALDI, 
JOHN STUART MILL: A BIOGRAPHY 1–54 (2004); ALAN RYAN, J.S. MILL 10–28 (1974). 
 11.  MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at xi (citing 10 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 
473 (John Bowring ed., Russel & Russel Inc. 1962) (1843)). 
 12.  See id. at 3–11. 
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philosophy, logic, mathematics, and political economy.13  At thirteen, he 
prepared summaries of his father’s discourses on the latter topic, and these 
were then used as paragraph resumes for James Mill’s Elements of Political 
Economy, which was used as a text in universities for decades.14  At fifteen, 
he began reading Bentham and decided then that the goal of his life should 
be “to be a reformer of the world.”15  Even his youthful antiauthoritarianism 
was appropriately directed toward good, progressive causes—at fifteen or 
sixteen he spent one night in jail for distributing birth control literature in the 
East End.16  The pace of Mill’s career only picked up from this point.  
Between the ages of sixteen and nineteen, he founded a debating club which 
he named “the Utilitarian Society”17 (this was the first time the term 
“utilitarian” was used in its philosophical sense), he became a regular 
contributor to the Westminster Review,18 a Benthamite journal of political 
and social criticism, and for eighteen months or so became Bentham’s 
amanuenses.19  Among other tasks, it was the young Mill’s job to gather, 
collate, and massage into a coherent essay a multitude of scraps of paper 
with thoughts and references, which Bentham customarily pinned to the 
curtain behind his desk. 
As part of his education, James Mill imparted his own agnosticism to his 
son.  As Mill puts it in his autobiography: 
It would have been wholly inconsistent with my father’s ideas of 
duty, to allow me to acquire impressions contrary to his convictions 
and feelings respecting religion: and he impressed upon me from 
the first, that the manner in which the world came into existence 
was a subject on which nothing was known: that the question, “Who 
made me?” cannot be answered, because we have no experience or 
authentic information from which to answer it . . . I am thus one of 
the very few examples in this country, of one who has, not thrown 
off religious belief, but never had it: . . . .  I looked upon the modern 
exactly as I had the ancient religion, as something which in no way 
concerned me.20 
 13.  See id. at 12–18. 
 14.  See id. at 18. 
 15.  See id. at 80. 
 16.  See JOHN STUART MILL, CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 28 (John Cunningham Wood ed., 
Routledge 1999) (1988). 
 17.  See MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 49. 
 18.  See id. at 120. 
 19.  See id. at 50. 
 20.  Id. at 27–28. 
DO NOT   1/9/13  2:27 PM 
[Vol. 39: 1401, 2013] Theism, Naturalism, and Liberalism 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1407 
Mill fully embraced his father’s skepticism.  In his autobiography he 
unleashed a surprisingly vitriolic broadside against religious belief and 
Christianity in particular.21  Organized religion was an “obstinate prejudice 
which makes men unable to see what is before their eyes”22 and Christianity 
is “not . . . a mere mental delusion, but . . . a great moral evil.”23  But the best 
was reserved for the Christian idea of God Himself whom Mill calls 
“eminently hateful.”24  And this is only a representative sample.  For some 
five or six remarkable pages in a work otherwise largely destitute of strong 
personal feeling, he decried what he took to be the irrationality and venality 
of orthodox Christianity.25 
Mill held these views unabated to the end.  In his essay Theism, written 
toward the end of his life, he followed the Comtean line that religion was 
destined to pass into metaphysics and metaphysics into science.26  Confident 
that the old monster of religion was finally dying, he could afford to take the 
more conciliatory view than some of his fellow-materialists—thinkers like 
d’Hollbach or Marx—who insisted that religion was an affirmative evil.  
Religious belief, Mill conceded, was “once [a thing] of great value but 
which can now be done without.”27  He predicted that traditional religious 
beliefs were “destined to disappear” at the hands of progress and 
secularization.28  In the essay, he subjected every aspect of religious belief to 
withering criticism, trashed the immortality of the soul as a deluded form of 
wishful thinking,—for who, he asked, would really want to live forever?—
and excoriated the account of the miracles in the Bible.29  He attacked the 
traditional philosophical arguments for God’s existence including the 
cosmological or “first cause” argument and the ontological argument, 
though he thought the argument from design slightly more promising for 
believers.30  He thought it possible that an impersonal God of the 
Philosophers exists—a cosmic ordering force in Nature—even though the 
evidence falls far short of proof and amounts “only to one of the lower 
 21.  See id. at 25–29. 
 22.  Id. at 29. 
 23.  Id. at 26. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 25–30. 
 26.  JOHN STUART MILL, Theism, in THREE ESSAYS ON RELIGION 123 (Gregg Int’l Publ’rs Ltd. 
1969) (1874). 
 27.  Id. at 126. 
 28.  Id. at 126–27. 
 29.  See id. at 196–211. 
 30.  See id. at 142–54. 
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degrees of probability.”31  But as for the personal God of Christianity—a 
God who is omniscient, omnipotent, and supremely good—Mill had only 
contempt: “The notion of a providential government by an omnipotent Being 
for the good of his creatures must be entirely dismissed.”32  Though he 
obviously doubted Christ’s divinity, like Bentham before him and secular 
humanists afterward, he was deeply impressed with Jesus’s character and 
wisdom, and gave him high marks as an enlightened moral sage: 
But about the life and sayings of Jesus there is a stamp of personal 
originality combined with profundity of insight, which . . . must 
place the Prophet of Nazareth, even in the estimation of those who 
have no belief in his inspiration, in the very first rank of the men of 
sublime genius of whom our species can boast.  When this pre-
eminent genius is combined with the qualities of probably the 
greatest moral reformer, and martyr to that mission, who ever 
existed upon earth, religion cannot be said to have made a bad 
choice in pitching on this man as the ideal representative and guide 
of humanity . . . .33 
But notwithstanding these concessions, Mill was moved to outrage by 
what he took to be the sheer moral contradiction of a God who was 
omnipotent, omniscient, and supremely beneficent with a world so full of 
evil.34  He sounded themes similar to those found in Rawls’s private 
correspondence a century later.35  The surplus of moral pain in the world left 
 31.  Id. at 242. 
 32.  Id. at 243. 
 33.  Id. at 254–55. 
 34.  See id. at 250–52 (describing moral contradictions of Christianity). 
 35.  When Rawls died in 2002, discovered among his papers was a short essay he had written in 
1997, entitled On My Religion.  JOHN RAWLS, A BRIEF INQUIRY INTO THE MEANING OF SIN AND 
FAITH: WITH “ON MY RELIGION” 259 (Thomas Nagel ed., 2009).  The essay tracks his changing 
views of Christianity over the course of his life.  Id. at 261.  In this paper he described himself as a 
young man as a conventional Episcopalian who lost his faith while fighting in World War II.  Id.  
Revelations of the Holocaust were the last straw: “How could I pray and ask God to help me, or my 
family, or my country, or any other cherished thing I cared about,” Rawls asked, “when God would 
not save millions of Jews from Hitler?”  Id. at 263.  After the war, he writes: 
The following months and years led to an increasing rejection of many of the main 
doctrines of Christianity, and it became more and more alien to me. . . .  I came to think 
many of them morally wrong, in some cases even repugnant.  Among these were the 
doctrines of original sin, of heaven and hell, of salvation by true belief . . . .  These 
doctrines all became impossible for me to take seriously, not in the sense that the 
evidence for them was weak or doubtful.  Rather, they depict God as a monster moved 
solely by God’s own power and glory.  As if such miserable and distorted puppets as 
humans were described could glorify anything!  I also came to think that few people 
really accept these doctrines or even understand them.  For them, religion is purely 
conventional and gives them comfort and solace in difficult times. 
Id. at 263–64. 
DO NOT   1/9/13  2:27 PM 
[Vol. 39: 1401, 2013] Theism, Naturalism, and Liberalism 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1409 
no doubt in his mind that if there was a God, He was either a bumbler or a 
moral monster.36  This sense of moral outrage reached the pitch of a 
Promethean defiance in his Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s 
Philosophy.37  It was here that Mill observed that while we may not know 
what it means to be infinitely good, we certainly know what it means to be 
“good.”38  If God’s moral principles are inconsistent with our own 
understanding of minimal goodness, then so much the worse for God’s 
principles.39  Then came the flourish that raised the eyebrows of even some 
of Mill’s more tolerant supporters: 
Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing 
which he shall not do: he shall not compel me to worship him.  I 
will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that 
epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me 
to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go.40 
Mill’s militant agnosticism was at one with his materialism, as we will 
see, but it clashed badly with the heart of his political philosophy which was 
always groping for something more—spiritual—in the human condition.  If 
there is no God, there can hardly be a soul.  But what, then, of the “self”?  
Mill would make self-realization the raison d’etre of liberalism,41 but what is 
it that we are to realize?  It is little wonder that Mill turned to romanticism to 
fill the yawning void between his materialism and his political ideals. 
Romanticism was not so much a movement as an eruption—the 
nineteenth-century reaction to the excessive rationalism of the 
Enlightenment.42  The romantics rejected the empiricism of Locke and 
Hume, and the rationalism of Descartes and Kant, along with the religious 
orthodoxy which these latter thinkers had supplanted, drawing instead from 
 36.  See generally MILL, supra note 26. 
 37.  9 JOHN STUART MILL, An Examination of William Hamilton’s Philosophy and of the 
Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in His Writings, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN 
STUART MILL (J.M. Robson ed., 1974) [hereinafter MILL, Examination of William Hamilton’s 
Philosophy]. 
 38.  Id. at 96. 
 39.  Id. at 103. 
 40.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 41.  See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 42.  See Christopher J. Borgen, Triptych: Sectarian Disputes, International Law, and 
Transnational Tribunals in Drinan’s Can God and Ceasar Coexist?, 45 J. CATHOLIC LEGAL STUD. 
11, 25 (2006) (discussing romanticism as a reaction to the Enlightenment). 
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a dizzying mélange of alternative philosophies.43  From Rousseau, they 
borrowed the notion that natural man is beneficent at heart, that he wants 
only to love and be loved, and that our natural goodness is only warped and 
corrupted by the trammels of social convention.44  From German idealism 
they inherited the notion that uniqueness is one with genius, and that the 
development of the authentic self is the most pressing ethical imperative on 
the individual.45  From Gnosticism, they took the insight that the profoundest 
spiritual truths are buried in the depths of the human soul, and that all 
customs, rules, habits, and conventions are obstructions to the life of the true 
self.46  In general, they exalted nature over convention, imagination over 
reason, the aesthetic over the ethical, spontaneous energy over systematic 
order, and the particular over the universal.47  They hated all things that had 
to do with business, the economic realities of life, the bourgeois order, and 
anything that smacked of balance or compromise.48  Conformity, 
bureaucratization, and industrialization—all the offspring of cold scientific 
reason, in their view—were the nemeses of the romantic imagination.49 
Yet romanticism was nothing if not a sentimentalized and secularized 
recrudescence of religion.50  In lieu of God it offered Spirit; in place of the 
immortal soul, the authentic self.  If there was moral truth to be had in life, it 
had to come from within, not from the external commands of some distant 
Law-Giver.51  Writing in the 1840s, Ralph Waldo Emerson—who had given 
up his Unitarian ministry to embrace a similar cacophony  of romanticism, 
idealism, and Buddhism—gave wing to these instincts in his essay, Self-
Reliance: 
To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in 
your private heart is true for all men,—that is genius.  Speak your 
 43.  See William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1886, 2004–12 (discussing the influence of romanticism on Herder and his rejection of 
the ideas of Locke, Hume, Descartes, and Kant). 
 44.  See IRVING BABBITT, ROSSEAU AND ROMANTICISM 111–37 (1919). 
 45.  See John Lawrence Hill, Law and the Concept of the Core Self: Toward a Reconciliation of 
Naturalism and Humanism, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 289, 328–29 (1997) (noting connections between 
German idealism and romanticism). 
 46.  See generally JAMES A. HERRICK, THE MAKING OF THE NEW SPIRTUALITY: THE ECLIPSE OF 
THE WESTERN RELIGIOUS TRADITION 270 (2004) (explaining Gnosticism). 
 47.  See Herbert M. Schueller, Romanticism Reconsidered, 20 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 
359, 359–60 (1962) (discussing the basic tenants of romanticism). 
 48.  See Frank Thilly, Romanticism and Rationalism, 22 PHIL. REV. 107, 114 (1913) (discussing 
romantic teachings of discontent in modern life). 
 49.  See generally id. 
 50.  See N. LEE ORR, DUDLEY BUCK 95 (2008) (explaining that in nineteenth-century America, 
romanticism was religiously sentimentalized and fused with Puritanism). 
 51.  See Anne C. Dailey, Holmes and the Romantic Mind, 48 DUKE L.J. 429, 434 (1998) (noting 
that according to Romantics, moral truth comes from “the creative and unconscious processes of the 
individual mind”). 
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latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for the inmost 
in due time becomes the outmost,—and our first thought is rendered 
back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment.52 
He extolled his hearers to “Insist on yourself; never imitate. . . .  Every great 
man is a unique.”53 
There was a self, after all, but it is given to us neither by God nor by 
society.54  It is at once a discovery and a creation—of ourselves, by 
ourselves.55  Self-individuation—this was to become the alpha and the 
omega of the liberal conception of freedom.56  This is what inspired Mill’s 
picture of the individual as it took shape in On Liberty.57 
III.  THE MILL OF ON LIBERTY 
Mill is most remembered today for his essay On Liberty, a work that 
rethought the foundations and implications of liberalism.58  Where Locke 
had rested his case for liberty on the authority of natural rights, and Bentham 
on utility, Mill took a very different tack.59  The true heart of liberalism, he 
argued, rested on the centrality of freedom in achieving self-individuation, a 
state of character in which the individual has most developed his personality 
in accordance with the inner springs of his own individual nature.60  In the 
spirit of humanism he wrote, “Among the works of man, which human life 
is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance 
surely is man himself.”61  Self-development, individuality, and genius were 
largely coextensive, realized in pursuit of one another.62  “Individuality is the 
same thing with development, and . . . it is only the cultivation of 
individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed human 
 52.  RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in SELECTED ESSAYS, LECTURES AND POEMS 148 
(1990). 
 53.  Id. at 168. 
 54.  See id. at 163 (noting that self-existence comes from the soul). 
 55.  See id. 
 56.  See JOHN LAWRENCE HILL, THE POLITICAL CENTRIST 24 (2009) 
 57.  See infra Part III. 
 58.  See MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 9. 
 59.  See ELDON J. EISENACH, NARRATIVE POWER AND LIBERAL TRUTH: HOBBES, LOCKE, 
BENTHAM, AND MILL 111 (2002) (discussing differences between Locke and Bentham). 
 60.  MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 82. 
 61.  Id. at 124. 
 62.  See id. at 128. 
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beings.”63  The cultivation of individuality depends upon the ability of every 
individual to discover and develop his true, authentic self.64  Freedom was 
both a means to, and a constitutive element of, self-individuation.65 
The spiritual heart of On Liberty is Chapter III, titled “Of Individuality, 
as One of the Elements of Well-Being.”66 It is here that the force of Mill’s 
romanticism comes into its full glory.  There is a self, he contends, and it is 
something more than the residue of customs and habits, a mere social 
construction, as we might refer to the self today: 
A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the 
expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified 
by his own culture—is said to have a character.  One whose desires 
and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a 
steam–engine has a character.67 
There is more than a hint of Aristotle’s old teleology in Mill’s remark that 
“Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do 
exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and 
develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces 
which make it a living thing.”68 
Freedom of choice is not simply a means to an end or a way of 
satisfying particular desires as Hobbes or Hume would have conceived it.69  
Freedom was part means and part end in itself.  Mill thought that choice-
making was literally constitutive of our self-creation.  In other words, our 
choices do not merely emanate from the already fully-formed self.  Rather, 
we create ourselves through the choices we make: 
The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative 
feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised 
only in making a choice.  He who does anything because it is the 
custom, makes no choice.  He gains no practice either in discerning 
or in desiring what is best.  The mental and moral, like the muscular 
powers, are improved only by being used.70 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See id. at 127–28. 
 65.  Id. at 136–37. 
 66.  Id. at 121. 
 67.  Id. at 125. 
 68.  Id. at 124 (emphasis added). 
 69.  See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 159–68 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier Books 1962) 
(1651) (detailing Hobbe’s views on liberty); DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 399–
407 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1739) (detailing Hume’s views on liberty). 
 70.  MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 123–24. 
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In all this there are distinct traces of Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s ideas that 
actions, repeated habitually, coalesce into one’s character.71  We form our 
own characters and literally become what our choices make us.  Mill parts 
ways from Aristotle and the conservatives only in exaggerating the cleavage 
between choice and tradition.72  Against the conservative view that time-
tested customs and mores provide an important social framework for 
character formation, Mill sided with the romantics in holding that true 
character can only be won in opposition to social influences—that social 
influences are the enemy of true self-formation because they threaten to 
overwhelm the authentic self.73 
Though Mill was in so many ways the harbinger of modern progressive 
liberalism, the most striking contrast with contemporary liberalism was his 
conviction that freedom and equality are values that will always be in 
tension with each other.74  Mill associated equality with social conformity 
and with a lack of individuality.  From Tocqueville he imbibed a fear of the 
tendency of democratic government to expand and to impose a stultifying 
equality of condition on its citizens.75  “It is not by wearing down into 
uniformity all that is individual . . . but by cultivating it and calling it 
forth . . . that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of 
contemplation . . . .”76 
Mill’s conception of political liberty depends crucially on a sense of 
freedom in the inward sense.  External political liberties permit self-
individuation by opening up spaces of social and personal 
experimentation—“experiments in living” as he called them.77  But it was 
the discovery, development, and expression of this inner self, the unfoldment 
 71.  See 2 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARTISTOTLE, at 34–36 (F.H. Peters trans., 
London, C. Kegan Paul & Co., 5th ed. 1893); THOMAS AQUINAS, AQUINAS ETHICUS 151–53 (Joseph 
Rickaby trans., London, Burns & Oates, Ltd. 1892). 
 72.  See MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 124 (disparaging those who let the world choose 
their plan of life for them, while promoting those that choose their plan for themselves). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Modern liberals, on the other hand, usually hold that freedom and equality are codependent 
variables.  Ronald Dworkin makes them virtually synonymous: “What does it mean for the 
government to treat its citizens as equals?  That is, I think, the same as the question of what it means 
for the government to treat all its citizens as free . . . .”  RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLE 191 (1985).  The essence of liberal government, he concluded, is to treat all citizens with 
“equal concern and respect.”  Id. at 195. 
 75.  See 3 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 887–94 (Eduardo Nolla ed., 
James T. Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund 2010) (1835) (discussing the conflict between freedom and 
equality). 
 76.  MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 127. 
 77.  See id. at 144. 
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of a rich, many sided, and autonomous personality, that is the true end of 
liberty.78  Mill made much the same argument in his essay, The Subjection of 
Women.79  Only when women are freed from their subordinate social and 
political position will they be able to develop truly autonomous wills.80  
Social liberty is both instrumental to and constitutive of the development of 
autonomous human personality, but it was the development of this authentic 
individuality itself that represents the highest mark of humanity and the 
surest guarantee of human happiness. 
Mill uses neither the terms autonomy nor authenticity, but his 
conception of human striving for self-individuation shows the unmistakable 
influences of Aristotle, Kant, and nineteenth century romanticism.  From 
Aristotle, we find the instance that this striving is a driving part of human 
personality and that happiness is virtually dependent on our achieving our 
telos as self-individuating beings.81  From Kant’s influence, among others, 
the idea that human beings must distance themselves from their 
heteronomous influences–desires, customs, habits, etc.82  But from the 
romantics, there is the idea that the individual must live a life of sufficiently 
varied experiences so that he can identify and follow those which resonate 
with his own innate character. 
All of this was Mill the liberal political philosopher, but it is all 
strangely at odds with how Mill the metaphysician conceived of the self or 
mind, freedom, and responsibility. 
IV.  MILL THE METAPHYSICIAN 
Mill was both a materialist and an heir to the British empiricist tradition 
which included Hobbes, Locke, and Hume.  With other materialists he 
thought that what we call the “mind” is at best an enigmatic side effect, of 
physical processes in the brain.  He developed his philosophical materialism 
in such places as his System of Logic83 and in his Examination of the 
Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton.84  In his System of Logic, Mill defended 
 78.  John Gray, Mills Conception of Happiness and the Theory of Individuality, in J.S. MILL ON 
LIBERTY: IN FOCUS 190, 198–99 (John Gray & G.W. Smith eds., 1991). 
 79.  JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (Forgotten Books 2008) (1869). 
 80.  See id. at 122–23 (noting the ways that women were denied liberty). 
 81.  See 1 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 229 (B. Jowett trans., Oxford, Clarendon 
Press 1885) (discussing the relation of telos to happiness). 
 82.  See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WORKS ON THE 
THEORY OF ETHICS 294 (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans., London, Longmans, Green & Co., 5th ed. 
1898). 
 83.  7 JOHN STUART MILL, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, in THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL (J.M. Robson ed., 1974) [hereinafter MILL, System of Logic]. 
 84.  MILL, Examination of William Hamilton’s Philosophy, supra note 37. 
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a cautious version of materialism according to which all mental states are 
causally dependent upon brain states: 
According to this theory, one state of mind is never really produced 
by another: all are produced by states of body.  When one thought 
seems to call up another by association, it is not really a thought 
which recals [sic] a thought; the association did not exist between 
the two thoughts, but between the two states of the brain or nerves 
which preceded the thoughts . . . .  On this theory the uniformities of 
succession among states of mind would be mere derivative 
uniformities, resulting from the laws of succession of the bodily 
states which cause them.  There would be no original mental laws, 
no Laws of Mind . . . and mental science would be a mere branch, 
though the highest and most recondite branch, of the science of 
physiology. 85 
This hypothesis is more controversial than it may at first appear.  If true, 
it entails that the traditional conception of the self as the “captain of the 
ship” is an entirely misleading picture of human psychology.  The traditional 
view associated with nonmaterialist accounts of human nature holds that the 
mind is autonomous and in control of the body—that we decide what we 
think, that we can call up thoughts, divert a train of consciousness, or put 
some intention into effect by acting upon it.  According to the traditional 
view, the mental causes the physical.  But materialism holds that this has it 
backwards: mind is at best the epiphenomena of our physical brain states 
which themselves occur deterministically in accordance with the physical 
laws of neurophysiology.  Thoughts and intentions are a product of brain 
states.  And so, in the deepest sense, are each of us.  What each of us calls 
our “self” is simply a bundle of thoughts and perceptions, which flow from 
our brain states. 
This, in turn, winds up having pernicious consequences for traditional 
ideas of free will.  The materialist thesis implies not only that mind is matter, 
but that the material processes in the brain operate strictly in accordance 
with the laws of cause and effect.  Contemporary philosophers have come to 
call this “the causal closure of the physical domain.”86  The idea is that 
 85.  MILL, System of Logic, supra note 83, at 850. 
 86.  This means that only physical things (such as brain processes) can have physical effects 
(such as bodily actions).  A thought is not a physical thing; thus, it cannot bring about any real 
physical actions such as me raising my arm.  The causal closure of the physical means not only that 
thoughts do not cause bodily movements but, as William Hasker puts it, “the mind cannot vary 
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thoughts and intentions themselves are causally irrelevant in determining 
human behavior.  Instead, one brain state leads to the next, and the 
corresponding thoughts produced by these brain states follow ineluctably in 
their train.  What we think, feel, and want are projections of the material 
brain processes—processes which are not under our control and which 
operate according to immutable laws of nature.  In sum, like most other 
naturalists, Mill was a determinist.  He insisted that “the law of causality 
applies in the . . . strict sense to human actions.”87  While he drew a verbal 
distinction between moral and physical causes—the causes of human 
behavior and the causes of physical phenomena—in the end, the former is 
simply a special case of the latter.  “A volition is a moral effect, which 
follows the corresponding moral causes as certainly and invariably as 
physical effects follow their physical causes.”88  When confronted with the 
common-sense reply to determinism: that each of us regularly has the 
subjective experience of being able to make a different choice than we did—
e.g., that we could have gone to a concert but chose to go to a movie 
instead—Mill explained this away as a fluke of our experience. 89   
Mill thought this hypothesis about how the brain operates was 
“extremely probable, [though it] cannot hitherto be said to be proved.”90  He 
did not go quite the full way with modern “eliminative” materialists, who 
maintained that the advance of neuroscience was likely to completely 
eliminate mental language; and that some day, perhaps in the not-too-distant 
independently of the body.”  See WILLIAM HASKER, THE EMERGENT SELF 59 (1999).  Or as 
Jaegwon Kim, a rigorous materialist characterizes the view, “any physical event that has a cause at 
time t has a physical cause at t.”  JAEGWON KIM, The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism, in 
SUPERVENIENCE AND MIND: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 265, 280 (1991). 
 87.  MILL, System of Logic, supra note 83, at 836.  Mill elaborated:  
[T]he doctrine called Philosophical Necessity is simply this: that given the motives which 
are present to an individual’s mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of 
the individual, the manner in which he will act might be unerringly inferred: that if we 
knew the person thoroughly, and knew all the inducements which are acting upon him, 
we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict any physical 
event. 
Id. at 836–37. 
 88.  MILL, Examination of William Hamilton’s Philosophy, supra note 37, at 446–47.  He 
followed Hume in doubting that there is any true necessity connecting causes and effects, adding that 
“whether it must do so, I acknowledge myself to be entirely ignorant . . . .  All I know is, that it 
always does.”  Id. at 447. 
 89.  Mill thought that we are misled by our experience in this way.  When we imagine the 
counterfactual “might have been” scenario, it always involves a different set of antecedent 
conditions—I would have gone to the pub if I had not given up beer for Lent or if I wasn’t trying to 
lose a few pounds.  Because we can imagine that things were different than they are and might then 
correctly imagine that we would have acted differently under those other conditions that doesn’t 
mean that we could or would have acted differently under the conditions as they are.  Given that 
things are what they are, we do what we do, and we do it without fail.  See generally MILL, 
Examination of William Hamilton’s Philosophy, supra note 37, at 437–69. 
 90.  MILL, System of Logic, supra note 83, at 851. 
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future, we will look back upon our entire mentalistic vocabulary of thoughts, 
desires, beliefs, and intentions as we now look back on spiritual explanations 
of physical events.  Instead he concluded that mental states have an 
important, if secondary, status all their own.  “If the word mind means 
anything,” Mill wrote, “it means that which feels.  Whatever opinion we 
hold respecting the fundamental identity or diversity of matter and mind, in 
any case the distinction between mental and physical facts, between the 
internal and the external world, will always remain as a matter of 
classification . . . .”91  This gives introspective psychology a kind of 
provisional, “for the time being” status as a science.  Our understanding of 
human psychology “must continue, for a long time at least, if not forever,” 
to be pursued at the level of psychology.92  Mill seems not to have doubted 
in the least that mental events were caused by and closely correlated with 
brain states. 
All this winds up having disastrous consequences for the traditional idea 
of the self.  If the mind is reducible to matter and if all of our choices are 
predetermined by physical laws, then what is left of the self, let alone the 
immortal soul?  These metaphysical considerations were underscored by 
Mill’s empiricism.  As an empiricist, Mill followed Locke, Berkeley, and 
Hume, each of whom had their own difficulties with the self.  But it was 
David Hume, the most ruthlessly skeptical of the empiricists, whom Mill 
followed most closely.  It had been Hume who insisted that our mental lives 
consist simply of a fleeting “bundle of perceptions,” the stream of 
consciousness as it unfolds in our moment-to-moment consciousness.93  
Hume dismissed the idea that there was a self, an enduring core of human 
personality that underlies and ties together these momentary experiences: 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I 
always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or 
cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure.  I never catch 
myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any 
thing but the perception.94 
Mill’s view was closest to Hume’s.  In his most detailed treatment of the 
concept of the self, his An Examination of William Hamilton’s Philosophy, 
 91.  Id. at 849. 
 92.  Id. at 851. 
 93.  See HUME, supra note 69, at 265 (noting that the “succession of perceptions . . . constitutes 
our self or person”). 
 94.  Id. at 252. 
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he observed, as Hume had, that our mental lives consist of “a succession of 
feelings, a thread of consciousness.”95  Yet he could not fully agree with 
Hume’s total reduction of the self.  Underlying the bundle of perceptions 
was, he thought, this uncanny sense of permanence, a continuity that 
connects these thoughts and feelings together as thoughts and feelings of one 
and the same subject.  
[O]ur notion of Mind . . . is the notion of a permanent something, 
contrasted with the perpetual flux of the sensations and other 
feelings or mental states which we refer to it; a something which we 
figure as remaining the same, while the particular feelings through 
which it reveals its existence, change.96 
But here Mill came to the final stumbling block of the Humean picture, a 
vicious circularity: I have one perception at one moment, and another at a 
different moment—but what makes each perception, one moment to the 
next, mine without presupposing a self to which each belongs and that 
provides the continuity? 
If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are 
obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings 
which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the 
alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different 
from any series of feelings . . . or of accepting the paradox that 
something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be 
aware of itself as a series.97 
In sum, either each thought and perception must somehow possess a 
germ of self-awareness—a strange hypothesis to be sure—or the self must 
be distinct from the bundle of perceptions which it experiences.  Mill’s 
intellectual honesty prevented him from giving full assent to the Humean 
account of the self.  He wound up his discussion by calling this the “final 
inexplicability” of the self.98  Mill concluded, “I think, by far the wisest thing 
we can do, is to accept the inexplicable fact, without any theory of how it 
takes place; and when we are obliged to speak of it in terms which assume a 
theory, to use them with a reservation as to their meaning.”99 
 95.  MILL, Examination of William Hamilton’s Philosophy, supra note 37, at 190. 
 96.  Id. at 189. 
 97.  Id. at 194. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id.; see also RYAN, supra note 10, at 255–56 (analyzing Mill’s conclusion). 
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V.  MILL THE MORALIST 
If Mill the metaphysician was a materialist and a determinist who was 
profoundly skeptical of the self, Mill the moralist and political philosopher 
had to find a way to cabin the ethical consequences of his naturalism.  At the 
extreme, naturalistic accounts of human personality lead in the direction of a 
Skinnerian conception of psychology and a managerial-interventionist form 
of government.  Recall that the influential behaviorist B.F. Skinner thought 
that the “self is not essential” and is “simply a device for representing a 
functionally unified system of responses.”100 Following from this, Skinner 
insisted that the traditional idea of freedom is a complete illusion, that 
human beings are ultimately controlled by their environment, and that the 
problem of government “is not to free men from control but to analyze and 
change the kinds of control to which they are exposed.”101  Skinner’s view 
may sound extreme to most of us today, but he was simply drawing the 
logical consequences of one form of psychological naturalism—
behaviorism.  While contemporary liberals rightly reject Skinnerian 
conceptions of personality and government, the managerial-deterministic 
idea of government has nevertheless crept insidiously into the sinews of 
contemporary liberal theory.102 
Closer to the ground, determinism obviously spells real problems for 
traditional notions of moral and legal responsibility.103  For example, it is 
hard to see how we can hold responsible the criminal offender for acts, 
which he was determined to commit.  Indeed, to punish him for these acts 
seems to be doubly unfair since it amounts to condemning him a second time 
for acts which, from the beginning of time, he was destined to endure 
 100.  B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 285 (1953). 
 101.  B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 43 (1971). 
 102.  A good example is the work of Cass Sunstein, who has argued for years that an important 
function of government must be to “correct” the distorted preferences of individuals whose decisions 
do not comport with those deemed rationally acceptable by social engineers.  See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986).  Sunstein questions the 
fundamental liberal assumption of individual autonomy in this article.  Id. at 1133 n.16; see also 
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2004) (an updated and expanded development of these ideas).  
Traditionalists, it must be noted, certainly do not assume that human decision making is always 
perfectly rational.  Far from it.  But they insist that perfecting the individual’s decision making is not 
a function of government and that, indeed, it leaves too much power in the hands of bureaucrats and 
social engineers. 
 103.  See BENJAMIN LIBET ET AL., CONSCIOUS WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY xi (Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong & Lynn Nadel eds., 2011) (discussing determinism as the main challenge to moral and 
legal responsibility). 
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committing.104  Perhaps even more paradoxically, an undiluted determinism 
appears to make even the prospect of moral reform quixotic.  After all, if 
determinism is an accurate picture of the way the world works, it should be 
no more possible to get society to change its approach to the offender than it 
is to get the offender to alter his actions toward society.  In this sense a strict 
determinism is a double-edged sword. 
Determinism also has pernicious implications at the other end of the 
ethical spectrum.  It inevitably threatens our ideas of merit and virtue just as 
surely as it undermines our conception of basic responsibility since it seems 
no more fair to reward a person for the accomplishments he was fated to 
achieve than it is to punish him for nefarious acts he was destined to 
perpetrate.  A consistent determinism is the great moral equalizer.  It 
threatens to undercut every claim to merit even as it excuses the most 
heinous act.  It should not surprise us, then, that contemporary liberalism is 
largely an equality-driven ethic.105  If everything that each of us has and does 
is a function of factors well beyond our individual control, then nothing—no 
punishment and no accolade—is ultimately deserved in the grand cosmic 
sense.  Genuine praise and blame require that we assume individuals are 
genuinely free and responsible for their actions.106 
Mill’s determinism left him in a potential quandary concerning each of 
these issues.  How are responsibility and punishment, merit, and political 
liberty reconcilable with a deterministic account of human behavior?  It is 
precisely at this point that Mill’s ethical theory—his utilitarianism—shifts 
the emphasis away from the problem of freedom and onto the question of the 
efficacy or utility of merit, responsibility, and punishment as means of social 
engineering. 
We can now pose two questions about Mill’s philosophy.  First, as a 
determinist, was there any sense in which Mill really thought we are “free” 
in the inward sense—in the traditionalist’s sense of possessing a free will?  
Second, how did he square his determinism with notions of self-creation, 
merit, responsibility, and punishment—all notions which seem to 
presuppose our inward freedom? 
To the first question: Are we free in the inward sense—Mill essentially 
answered “yes and no.”  To be more precise, he subtly redefined the ideas of 
“freedom” and “responsibility” to make them compatible with 
determinism.107  He adopted and refined a position previously developed by 
 104.  Of course, this is exactly what some social scientists have contended for some time.  See 
KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968). 
 105.  See L.T. HOBHOUSE, LIBERALISM 20 (2009) (discussing how liberalism can be viewed as a 
movement towards equality). 
 106.  See TERENCE IRWIN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS: FROM KANT TO RAWLS 26 (2009) 
(noting that praise or blame requires a free will). 
 107.  See generally MILL, Examination of William Hamilton’s Philosophy, supra note 37. 
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Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Bentham, among others—a position William 
James derisively called “soft determinism,” but which its twentieth-century 
defenders have renamed “compatibilism.”108  Determinism can be made 
compatible with freedom by insisting that a person still acts “freely” if she 
acts from her own desires and preferences, even though these preferences 
have been causally determined.109  For example, a person may love 
chocolate cake as the result of a complex set of genetic and environmental 
factors that have shaped his preference.  Given this preference and the right 
external conditions—e.g., that he now finds himself at the pastry counter of 
his favorite lunch shop with some extra money in his pocket—he will buy 
the chocolate cake.  While his act of buying the cake is determined by all the 
background conditions that have shaped his preferences, his act is 
nonetheless “free” on compatibilist accounts because the preference is his 
and because he has done exactly what he wanted to do.  Acts are only unfree 
when they have coerced or compelled, i.e., when internal or external 
conditions override the will and force the actor to do what he would not 
otherwise do of his own accord.110 
Of course, no traditionalist denies that our preferences are shaped by our 
genetic and environmental conditions.111  To some extent we are all 
obviously formed by our condition and circumstances in the world, but we 
are not bound by our conditions to act in one way only.  What the 
traditionalist denies and the determinist affirms is that, given the conditions 
which pertain to a particular moment in time, the actor had to do exactly 
 108.  He wrote that hard determinists: 
[D]id not shrink from such words as fatality, bondage of the will, necessitation, and the 
like.  Nowadays we have a soft determinism which abhors harsh words, and . . . says that 
its real name is freedom; for freedom is only necessity understood, and bondage to the 
highest is identical with true freedom.” 
JAMES, supra note 6, at 590.  Soft determinism is “a quagmire of evasion.”  Id. 
 109. John Martin Fischer, Compatibilism, Four Views on Free Will 44–84 (2007) (discussing 
compatibilist conceptions of freedom.)  
 110.  See id. 
 111.  Soft determinism is plausible because we understand that our desires and motives obviously 
do influence our behavior while coerced behavior is clearly not free.  It is also attractive from an 
empiricist standpoint because it avoids the murky problem of freedom of the will by shifting 
freedom’s locus: freedom becomes an attribute not of the will, but of physical bodies or, in its more 
sophisticated form, actions.  In its cruder Hobbesian form, men are free in exactly the same way that 
a falling object is free to reach the ground, or an undammed river is free to run its course: freedom is 
simply unobstructed physical movement.  “[F]rom the use of the word free will, no liberty can be 
inferred of the will,” as Hobbes declared, “but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he 
finds no stop in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.”  HOBBES, supra note 69, at 
159. 
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what he did.  For the traditionalist, there is an “openness” in the fabric of 
reality that leaves future possibilities contingent.  This is what all 
determinists deny. 
This leads us to the second question.  Given his determinism (even in 
the compatibilist form), how could Mill hope to preserve some conception of 
self-creation, which was so essential to his ideal of political liberty?  And 
how could he salvage the notion of personal responsibility central to our 
most basic notions of praise, blame, and punishment?  As to the problem of 
self-creation, Mill argued that our actions are determined by our will, our 
will by our desires, our desires by our motives, and our motives by our 
character.112  All this is consistent with his determinism.  But then comes the 
problem: How is it that we have control over our own character? 
The true doctrine of the Causation of human actions 
maintains . . . that not only our conduct, but our character, is in part 
amenable to our will; that we can, by employing the proper means, 
improve our character; and that if our character is such that while it 
remains what it is, it necessitates us to do wrong, it will be just to 
apply motives which will necessitate us to strive for its 
improvement, and so emancipate ourselves from the other necessity: 
in other words, we are under a moral obligation to seek the 
improvement of our moral character.113 
In sum, we can change our character if we have the desire to do so.  And if 
we do not have the desire to do so, we must martial other (second-order) 
motives to change our (first-order) desires. 
The problem with this, as every freshman philosophy student sees, is 
that it is all viciously circular.  My desires flow ultimately from my 
character but my character flows from my desires.  Put differently, I can 
only change my character given the right motives and desires, but how can I 
change my desires and motives if they have been causally determined?  
Determinists hold that my desires and motives have to be exactly what they 
are given the antecedent causes—my genetic predispositions, the 
environment, and other formative conditions—that have brought them 
about.114  To suggest that I can change these is to step outside the 
deterministic web that enshrouds all human actions.  If, from a cosmic 
standpoint, everything that happens had to happen—and had to happen 
exactly as it has happened—in what sense can we be responsible for our own 
character? 
 112.  See MILL, Examination of William Hamilton’s Philosophy, supra note 37, at 465. 
 113.  Id. at 466. 
 114.  See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
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The same problem reappears in Mill’s theory of responsibility and 
punishment.115  The traditionalist holds that punishment can only 
legitimately be imposed when the actor is responsible for his act, and that 
actor can only be responsible for his act if it was free—i.e., if he could have 
chosen and acted other than he did.116  The traditionalist’s view of 
responsibility is “backward looking” in the sense that one’s responsibility 
for an outcome requires that we look back to the nature of the act itself—to 
whether the actor could have done other than what he did.117  Since Mill 
denied that there is this kind of freedom in the world, he relocated the 
emphasis.118  As a utilitarian, Mill reversed the order of priority between the 
questions of responsibility and punishment.119  Rather than “looking 
backwards” to the freedom of the act, the utilitarian “looks forward” from 
the question of responsibility to the question of whether punishment serves 
some utilitarian purpose.120  On utilitarian accounts, an actor is “held 
responsible” for his act if punishing him will increase the net utility or 
happiness of society.121  As Bentham argued before Mill, the real function of 
punishment is not retribution but deterrence—deterring similar bad acts on 
the part of the offender (specific deterrence) or among others who might be 
tempted to commit similar acts (general deterrence).122  On utilitarian 
accounts of responsibility and punishment, whether the actor was actually 
“free” in performing the act appears to lose its significance. 
I say that the question of freedom appears to lose its significance 
because Mill was not able to fully escape the question of freedom after all.  
For how can an act be deterred by threat of punishment unless the offender 
is in some sense free to alter his behavior in response to the threat of 
punishment?  In sum, even deterrence seems to require some measure of real 
freedom in the sense that the offender “could have done otherwise.” 
It is here that Mill’s account grows murky.  He argued that punishment 
is justified “if the expectation of punishment enables [the offender] to help 
 115.  See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text. 
 116.  See supra note 112 and accompanying text; see also J. ANGELO CORLETT, RESPONSIBILITY 
AND PUNISHMENT 11 (3d ed. 2009). 
 117.  See John L. Hill, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externalization of Responsibility in the 
Law: A Philosophical Analysis, 76 GEO. L.J. 2045, 2057 (1988). 
 118.  See infra notes 123–24 and accompanying text. 
 119.  See infra notes 123–24 and accompanying text.. 
 120.  See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 33–38 (5th ed. 2009) 
(explaining the utilitarian justifications of punishment). 
 121.  See id. at 34. 
 122.  See id. at 33–36. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/9/13  2:27 PM 
 
1424 
it . . . .  If . . . the impression is strong in his mind that a heavy punishment 
will follow, he can, and in most cases, does, help it.”123  In other words, 
where the traditionalist assumes that threat of punishment operates by giving 
the offender an additional reason not to commit a crime, Mill describes the 
threat of punishment not as a reason, but as a cause—another determinant of 
human behavior: 
Punishment proceeds on the assumption that the will is governed by 
motives.  If punishment had no power of acting on the will, it would 
be illegitimate, however natural might be the inclination to inflict it.  
Just so far as the will is supposed free, that is, capable of acting 
against motives, punishment is disappointed of its object, and 
deprived of its justification.124 
The threat of punishment, on Mill’s account, is one determinant of the 
actor’s behavior: without the threat, he would commit the crime, but in 
virtue of the threat, he is deterred.  But isn’t this what the traditionalist calls 
“making a choice?”  For the traditionalist, who believes in a conception of 
free will rooted in a nonnaturalistic idea of the self, the threat of punishment 
operates by remedying the defect of better motives—i.e., by offering the bad 
man an external inducement to behave himself.  To insist that this must be a 
cause is to beg the question that lies at the center of the whole debate about 
whether materialism is true. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Mill’s conception of the individual self and the central human 
importance of freedom cannot be harmonized with his metaphysical 
materialism.  He was a political libertarian and a metaphysical determinist.  
Yet, what sense can a materialist make of the “inward forces” of the 
authentic self?  What is this self, and how are we to distinguish one’s 
“authentic” desires from those that are merely the product of social 
conditioning?  Moreover, how can a strict determinist possibly exalt the 
values of freedom and the self-creating propensities of choice?  What sense 
can it make, after all, to protect and enshrine as the highest object of our 
social life human choices that have been fated to occur from the beginning 
of time? 
The tensions in Mill’s thoughts are the tensions of modern liberalism.  It 
is no coincidence that modern liberals vacillate between deterministic 
accounts of human psychology—behaviorist, social constructionist, or 
 123.  See MILL, Examination of William Hamilton’s Philosophy, supra note 37, at 458. 
 124.  Id. 
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Freudian—and accounts which trade heavily on the romantic and Millian 
notions of authenticity, self-realization, and self-individuation.  These 
tensions are fundamentally metaphysical in nature.  And they are ultimately 
connected with whether we accept an essentially naturalistic worldview or 
one that leaves space for freedom, responsibility, and genuine self-
individuation.  The latter possibility, I have suggested, is only approachable 
from the perspective of a nonnaturalistic metaphysic—a metaphysic that 
leads us, ultimately, to the threshold of theism. 
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